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I wish to thank very much Messrs. Smith and Howard of the Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Company for inviting me to speak before you. I am indeed
delighted to be here. Nevertheless, I am mindful that I start from a rather
disadvantageous position for two reasons « First of all it may be very
difficult for me, even under the most auspicious of circumstances, to keep
up with the overall tone of prepeiredness and quality that has been set by
our hosts and the speakers before me, let alone when entering into the
picture on a very short notice, But the greatest obstacle that I feel I
must overcome, are the expectations that you have built about this particu-
lar session. For I know that I am substituting for Dr. Hitch, a recognized
authority in the area of management information and control systems. Well,
the only thing I can do is to do my best.
The topic of my presentation is Managerial Information Systems for
Planning and Control, By this I mean systems whose focus of attention is
simply management.
^Address delivered before the Third International Investment Symposium.
This paper draws heavily on the results of the author's research as reported
in a working paper entitled, "Toward Intelligent Management Information
Systems", Sloan School of Management, M.I,T,, 155-65,
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Many of the systems currently used are either technique centei?ed or
hardware biased* The system designer in most of these cases primarily
attempts to employ the tools he has. The needs he satisfies, therefore,
are only those suggested by his immediate knowledge, environment, and
technical capabilities of his tools. The question "Can management needs be
satisfied better?" is rarely asked for it presupposes a knowledge of what
information managers need in order to manage better. We have often heard
that managers are at the mercy of the accountant and his bookkeepers who
thrive on the mysticism of their debits, credits and variances. Recent
technological progress is slowly but surely rendering old methods obsolete
and in the process freeing management of this bondage, but in its place a
new and more formideible one is established* In the future managers will
have to contend more and more with the systems-man, his programmers and
computers. The sooner managers realise this and take an active interest in
the design of the information systems of their organizations, the better off
they will be. The stakes now are much greater because of the greater
potential for centralization that large computers allow.
The systems with which I will be dealing here derive their character-
istics from managerial needs. It is on the basis of these needs that
computers justify their existence and not the other way around. The aim
is to relieve the manager of a lot of his present repetitive control and
decision-making activities, allow him for reasons that I will soon explain,
to devote more time to planning, and provide him with information for
guiding his actions and determining the efficiency of his planning efforts.
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Such systems must be capable of drawing inferences and probabilistic
conclusions on the basis of incomplete information, and also generalizing
from experience. In short, the managerial Information systems of the future
must be intelligent*
In order that I carry out the task that I set before me I will divide
my presentation into three parts;
In Part I I will provide the motivation for this exercise in future
systems design for managerial planning and control, and in the process also
establish the general cheiracteristics of the information managers need to
carry out these activities.
In Part II I will trace the stages through which an information system
must advance before it can be called intelligent, and look for clues and a
framework which will help us advance sequentially and design systems
possessing more and more of the desirable managerial attributes*
Finally, in Part III I will describe some of my efforts to design
intelligent managerial information systems*
Part I: Motivation — Planning and Information Requirements
If we examine management activities we find that these fall into two
general categories:
A. Planning, and
B. Control of plans and operations,
A. Planning
Under planning one can include such activities as
t
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1, Establishing Overall Organizational Objectives '
This activity is concerned with the formalization of the most
important value judgments which affect and prejudice organizational plans.
It is the birth place of the restrictions which curb freedom of action*
2« Developing the Theoretical (Non-Operational) Plans Vfhich Are
Considered Necessary to Carry Out the Overall Objectives
Although a lot of value judgments are made at this stage yet
the value-judgment content of managerial plans and decisions is not as great
here as at stage 1, And this because the value judgments made at Stage 1
introduce constraints or factual elements (information) for Stage 2» in the
same way that the value judgments made at Stages 1 and 2 provide factual
elements (information) for every subsequent stage. This process shows that
sequentially as we go down the hierarchy of management the freedom to
exercise value judgments is curbed by all the fixities and decisions
introduced at higher levels. The implications of this realization for the
management measurement process are quite significant. For it implies that
the information system must provide signals for assessing!
(a) the efficiency of operations, i.e.| how well the freedom to exercise^
value judgments is utilized at the various levels in the organizational
hierarchy given the constraints (planning restrictions), and
(b) the efficiency of the planning processo i.e., whether the cause
and effect relationships which are assumed in the process of establishing
the factual elements, that is to say, the functional relationships inherent
in the various transformations of objectives to plems, are efficient i.
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3. Translating the Theoretical Objectives and Plans to a Whole /
Chain of Operational Objectives, Subobjectives, Plans and Subplans
It should be obvious at this stage that there is practically an
infinite number of ways these translations and transformations can be made.
No one, therefore, can be certain that the chosen configuration of plans is
the optimum path to the objectives of the organization. Only in a probabil-
istic sense an a priori evaluation can be made, and this only among the
alternatives brought forward by the planning process. For these reasons the
information system must be flexible to adapt sequentially, question the
plans, and provide signals on the applicability of the assumed functional
relationships,
U, Budgeting Plans and Operations
At this point, time relationships are introduced in the planning
process. If the information system is to aid managers in their long-run
planning activities it must therefore be sensitive to the time profile of
plans, operations, resource flows and accomplishments
o
5. Assigning Plans to Responsibility Units
By this time, in the process of transformation of objectives, etc.,
most of the characteristics of the organization structure of the firm have
been determined. The technological and technical characteristics of objectives
and operations as well as the personal philosophy of top management, on the
degree of value judgment allowed their subordinates, have left unmistakably
their mark on the organizations The assignment, therefore, of plans to
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responsibility units is just the outward manifestation of issues of
centralization and decentralization^determined by the process of trans-
fonnat ion , * That is one of the reasons why the latter is so important for
the design of efficient information systems.
6. Designing the Information and Control System Which Will Compare
the Results from Operations Against the Operating Plans, the
Latter Against the Theoretical Plans and Finally Theoretical
Plans Against the Overall Objectives
B. Control
In order that the information system perform effective control
functions it must:
It Measure and Determine Deviations From Desirable Performance
This implies that in addition to the rules of measurement we
must have the means for generating appropriate signals on the basis of
observed differences in performance.
2. Coordinate the Various Activities
The way it is used here, coordination implies reconciliation of
interdependencies so that destructive interferences be eliminated and
complementarities be accentuatedo Note that if we were dealing with
For an analysis of the factors affecting centralization and decentral-
ization, see: Zenon S, Zannetos, "On the Theory of Divisional Structures:
Some Aspects of Centralization and Decentralization of Control and Decision
Making", Management Science , Vol, 12j, No. 4^ December 1965, pp. U9-68.
^We say that two activities are complementary if both together
generate a value to the organization which is greater than the sum of the
values of the individual activities if planned independently of each other.
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perfectly competitive markets, coordinative controls would be unnecessary.
But under such circumstances economies of specialization, research and
development and innovation would also be relatively absent, and the firms
would not be earning a profit but something close to a financial rent.
3. Encourage Learning by Making Available Specialized Information ^
One of the most important purposes of the control process is not
to generate signals for reward and punishment but to provide information at
th« operating level for learning and specialization,
•, Motivate Those Who Determine the Allocation of Resources to Do
So Efficiently ^
Every aspect of the information and control system of an
organization as viewed here has motivational purposes. If the recipients
of information cannot be influenced through information, it is useless to
provide it. There seems to be a lot of confusion approaching schizophrenia
on this issue within many organizations,
5. Provide Premises for Remedial Action ^
The implication here is that the information system must not only
provide the signals indicating the existence of problems but also whatever
information is necessary for the decisions which should follow.
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6t Encourage the Use of Substabilities and Standardization As a /
Means to Innovation Rather Than as an End in Themselves
Many organizations use their information systems to impose
behavioral conformity (human) and are happy if operations are perpetually
under control. The systems we will be discussing view these occurrences
as opportunities for action rather than inaction.
7. Aid Management in Replanning at Whatever Level in the
Hierarchy is Necessary
The above control functions complete the feedback loop and the
planning process starts all over again*
C. Computers and Their Impact
Obviously managers need information to carry out their planning and
control activities efficiently. The tjnpe of information that they have
had up to now, mostly came through the regular accounting system of their
organizations. Incidentally, accounting is the most comprehensive and
integrated information system in operation today, if not the only one. It
is very efficient for stewardship purposes but not for internal managerial
decisions. It must be supplemented and extensively changed if it is to be
•3
The term "substability" means a temporary, artificial or assumed
stability. Substabilities are very useful for purposes of problem solving
in that they order an otherwise chaotic situation and as such are used as
stepping stones to higher level solutions.
This topic is treated extensively in: Zenon S. Zannetos and
Otto Poensgen, "Innovation, Operational Control and the Management Infor-
mation System", The Business Quarterly (Canada), Winter Issue, (forthcoming).
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used for decision making. Its last major innovation was the introduction
of flexible budgets and standard costs but even this aspect as we will
shortly point out has not been fully exploited.
During the last twenty years we witnessed considerable progress in the
use of operations research techniques^ i,e,) in the use of mathematical and
statisticeil methods for managerial decision making, and in the behavioral
sciences, especially in the area of perception of information and motivation;
but above all, the progress has been startling in the area of information
theory and computer sciences. We now, for the first time, have the
technical capability to do what we should have done a long time ago, to
fuse a lot of these areas together, view the firm in terms of interacting y
subsystems and therefore design information systems that are really
managerial.
As our capability develops to exploit the potentials of man-machine
interaction systems, pattern recognition, and in general artificial intel-
ligence
,
managerial planning and control will more and more become a
science, utilizing fully the innate capacity of human beings. These systems
we feel will serve as an extension to the human brain power, enabling us to .
do things we have not dreamed before, but for sure these systems will not
subjugate us. No doubt managers especially at the middle management levels
will be extensively affected- A lot will be rendered obsolete and others
will have to go through a painful period of extensive reorientation and
change of attitude as "proprieteury rights" to internal, sensitive information
and loyalty of subordinates begin to collapse,
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Up to now we have not made much progress in the area of intelligent
computerized information systems for planning and control. Most of the
systems in industrial operation today and by this I mean any industry
including banking and finance, exploit the speed and consistency of
computers for data processing but not much of their potential intelligence.
The truth is that most computer installations today are not used efficiently.
This is not to deny that most computerized systems are more efficient than
the manual systems they displace. The issue is that often the opportunity
cost of the computer time utilized by these operations far exceeds the
value they generate. Before acquiring new capacity the organization should
always analyze to find out if the value of the least valuable operation
can justify the cost of the additional capacity. Unfortunately, however,
many do not question existing operations to find candidates for elimination
but instead rush to increase the capabilities of their installations.
Another characteristic of most existing systems is that they ar«
partial, i.e., they do not cover the entire spectrum of the firm's
activities.
Operational or process control, meaning control of low level
manufacturing operations or routine operating tasks manufacturing or
clerical, is one of the first cureas to be computerized following the
This term is defined as the expected value from the best alternative
use of the scarce resource.
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automation of routine accounting functions. And this of course for good
reasons. Operating process control is relatively easy as compared to
planning process control. But the latter is much more critical for the
success of the firm. The few attempts that have been made to simulate
planning and operations and develop total systems, gave a tremendous
impetus to the state of the art but fell short of solving our problems.
And the reason is that these systems are ad hoc or special purpose systems
with no adaptive capabilities or intelligence with the exception of what
is stored through human intervention. Furthermore » these systems do not
possess the capability of self-validation nor do they provide for the ''
generation of the data that are necessary for their implementation. No
system can succeed in satisfying managerial needs unless it is continuous
and builds directly upon an efficient data gathering system. These short-
comings of special purpose systems ace indeed critical as anyone who has
dealt with these systems can attest,
D. Planning versus Operating Process Control
I have been and will be consistently putting emphasis on the planning
(rather than the operating) side of the managerial activities and this may
disturb some of my listeners. For after all, are not the operations the
flesh and blood of an organization? Doesn't the success or failure of the
firm depend on the success and failure of its day to day generation of
products and services?
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The answer of course is undeniably yes but only in the short run.
Planning as we have seen sets the structure within which decisions and
operations take place. In this sense it is the skeleton, the foundation
on which operations add flesh. And if this skeleton or foundation is weak
or absent no amount of plastering or padding can make it take permanently
the shape of a beautiful and healthy structure. In its absence, operations
will be a bowl of jelly, i.e., amorphous. That is why I will be stressing
planning because it sets the sttnicture, establishes factual premises out
of value judgments and as such prejudices decisions and operations over the
long run. But frankly I believe that we do not have to compromise here or
stress the one at the expense of the other. Both planning and operations
are inextricably interdependent and in the systems that we are discussing
control of operations is a modular part of the planning process. This is
one of the things that computers make possible. They allow us to build
detailed subsystems which modularly fit into the total system, and most
important, enable us to improve on the consistency of parts. In other
words they allow us to look at the trees but not forget the forest and
vice versa. If we look back at the description of the components of the
planning and control process we will readily appreciate how important
are these attributes.
Because of their consistency and accuracy, computers also allow us
to relegate with confidence to the system all planning which becomes
operational and all operations that are amenable to standardisation.
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Once managers are relieved of routine tasks they can devote more time to
plan and learn about new areas of endeavor, only to do the same again as
soon as the latter are routinizedo This is a never ending process , and
so is improvement.
Admittedly it is much easier to design an information system for
controlling operations than for controlling the planning process. The
reasons for the difficulty in the case of planning arej
1, Absence of structure. We have mentioned that planning sets the
structure for operations but presently there exists nothing to set the
constraints for planning. Normalization or standardization is not
possible as yet and with its absence there can be no problem identification
f
or pattern recognition.
2, Absence of many factual elements. In the case of operations we
are dealing with engineering cause and effect relationships on a one to one
basis but in the case of planning we are dealing with value premises. But
we must stress again that given the factual elements for accomplishing
the value premises we have the ingredients of an efficient information
system, because it can generate signals on the applicability of the
assumed functional relationships and even on the value premises themselves.
That is to say the information that is introduced in the process of planning
and transformation of plans creates one to one relationships out of
situations where normally exist many to many. This is the information that
ve must introduce into the formal information systems of the organization if
we wish to provide managers with signals useful for planning and decision
making.
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I am sure that as practitioners in this cU?ea of general management
you more than anyone else appreciate that on an a priori basis there is no
way we can determine with certainty whether, given the objectives » the plan
that you chose is the best plan or the only plan, Furthermore, once we can
agree that there is one-many correspondence between objectives and plans
then for sure we must agree that there is one-many correspondence between
objectives and operations to implement the plans.
3, Presence of uncontrollable environmental conditions. Environmental
conditions play a critical role in both plans and operations. In the case
of operations most of these conditions originate within the organization
and can therefore be actively controlled in most cases. In contrast,
planning has to deal mostly with factors originating outside the organiza-
.
tion (exogenous) and therefore uncontrollable. The only thing managers
can do in such cases is to predict the consequences of variations in these
environmental factors in order to counteract them but for sure not eliminate
them.
For the above reasons planning up to now has been done on an ad_ hoc
basis and it is not part of the continuous information system of
organizations. Such practices, that is to say planning on an ad hoc basis,
obviously are very dangerous. Because:
a) There is nothing to guarantee that planning will be done
rationally or consistently;
b) Since extensive time element enters between the adoption of
a plan and its implementation, planning is not so repetitive
as to:
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(i) generate automatic response behavior i or
(il) allow a planner an opportunity to utilize the
/
knowledge he gained through experience. That is to
say, the planner may not be there long enough to meet
the same situation twice. So the experience is not
exploited. And even if he meets a similar situation
and does use the information again, the organization
only benefits through his presence. No one else can
benefit from his mistakes and accumulated wisdom.
The benefits from learning, therefore, are not accruing to the
organization but only to the individual. In other words, the stock of
planning knowledge today is not transferable . How then under these
conditions do we expect to train planners? Especially if the stock of
knowledge is ever increasing? Train through apprenticeship? This is a
very serious matter with the present need for managers,
I am sure that you must have heard caricatures of the successful
planner similar to this one. He is asked by the aspiring young executive
how he plans, and the answer comes back promptly, "through intuition and
experience", "But how can I learn from your intuition and experience?"
the young man insists, "Rise through the ranks, my boyj," the sage old man
retorts. This caricature of course does not represent such an exaggeration
of what goes on today within organizations. And this does not speak very
well for both ourselves as educators of managers or the managers themselves,
for it implies that there is not much in terms of fundamental material that
can be transmitted formally. Can you imagine what will happen if we were
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to depend on apprenticeship to train planners as time goes by and operations
become more complex? The apprentices will probably retire before they
graduate to the managerial ranks. It is obvious that training future
managers is a very critical area for management and that we cannot let it
develop haphazardly. We cannot, therefore, depend on apprenticeship nor
on the personal information system of each and every planner* We must
develop a system which stores the accumulated planning stock of knowledge
and makes it available for retrieval and learning.
From the introductory material two things are clear: (i) that planning
and control of the planning process are very critical managerial functions,
and (ii) that if we are to develop information systems for planning we need
to:
(a) Incorporate into the information system the environmental
conditions which affect the planning variables as well as the
functional relationships that tie the two together.
(b) Monitor and search, to sense changes in the assumed functional
relations between the environmental conditions and the plans. The
differences or deviations picked up by the system will then serve
as signals for possible problem identification.
(c) Have a flexible information structure to allow for different
aggregations and one-to-one information correspondence between
plans and operations.
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(d) Develop information systems with prognostic not only
diagnostic or post mortem capabilities. It does not help much
to know that something went wrong and a lot of resources were
wasted. It is better if the information system gives signals
that something is going wrong while there is time to curb it,
and even better that something will go wrong if certain steps are not
taken to prevent it. We needj therefore, information systems that
are intelligent, associative and adaptive. Systems which will be
adaptable or flexible enough so that we can relegate to them all
managerial functions which we can program or can describe in terms
of heuristics. And this so that management can free itself to
deal with more abstract planning and functional relationships*
Note in this conjunction that the system is used continuously as
a substability or a stepping stone to higher and higher level
problem solving. This is a never ending hierarchical piKJcess.
Such systems will give us signals ahead of time and so enable
us to avoid problems rather than bring them to our attention
after the damage has been done.
Let us now turn to the stages through which information systems must
advance xo acquire intelligence.
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II. Steps Toward Intelligence
I hope that the arguments I have just presented do not lead you to
the erroneous conclusion that it is a hopeless task to even attempt to
provide information systems for managerial planning, and for control of
the planning process. That the task is difficult there is no doubt, but
hopeless it is not.
In order to design an efficient information system one has to first
realize that managerial activities occur within a probabilistic and not a
deterministic setting. This obvious sounding observation has been the
major stumbling block of many otherwise ambitious and diligent efforts in
the past to design information systems which aid managers to plan, decide,
and maneige better* Once this transition is made, however, and all its
implications are realized, half of the battle is won. Because then the
characteristics of the environment within which management operates both
external as well as internal will of necessity be introduced into the
system and thus create flexibility for sequential learning and adaptation
through "after-the-event" analysis. This I consider as a great accomplish-
ment if achieved. To the extent that we cannot very well predict the state
of ail the environmental factors affecting our operations over the time
period covered by our plans, a priori optimization gives way to sequential
analysis s learning o and estimation. That is why I believe that If we
succeed in instilling in our information systems flexibility and a healthy
questioning attitude then sequentially we will reach better and better
solutions and continue improving practically ad infinitum . We must not,
therefore!, wait until we can "optimize" the whole gamut of organizational
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activities, whatever that means, before we begin. Let us start from where
we are , even if we have to assume a^ priori that we are doing the best we
can, and sequentially exploit the intelligence of our information systems.
Let us now analyse the stages through which an information system
must advance to acquire intelligence and ponder over the implications of
this maturing process for managerial information systems. In order that
an information system become eventually intelligent, it must gradually
acquire the capability for:
1, Storage of Raw Data ; At this stage the system has cells for
storage and a method of storage of data. As long as there are
empty cells data are recorded haphazardly. To be useful, the
method of storage must somehow provide for rejection of informa-
tion if no empty storage cells exist so as to avoid cluttering,
2, Classification of Data into Homogeneous Entities ; In order
to be helpful, an information system must not only be able to
store data but comprehend some type of rules for classification
of the data into meaningful entities. This is an elementary self-
organization capability. Without it learning cannot start. Some-
how the system must begin to classify the data on the basis of
their common characteristics. It must, therefore, be also
capable of active perception not only passive absorption.
See Zenon S. Zannetos, "Toward Intelligent Management Information
Systems"^ SSM, MIT Working Paper #115-65. These steps are in many respects
similar to the steps toward artificial intelligence discussed by Marvin
Minsky in Computers and Thought , Edward A, Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman
(Eds.), McGraw-Hiii Book Company, New York, 1963, pp. U06-U50,
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3, Extractinf: Differences ; One of the requirements of any
information system which is used for control purposes, is its
ability to venerate signals on the basis of deviations. It ^
does this through a matching process. These differences that
are generated by the matchinr^ process often indicate the
existence of potential problems. The next step therefore after
an ability to classify is the ability to perceive quantitative
(not qualitative as yet) differences in classifications that are
otherwise qualitatively identical.
U. Storar^e of Cues for Automatic Response at the Operatinp, Level ;
The next step in terms of increasing sophistication is for the
information system to react on the basis of the comparisons it
performs and take elementary remedial action. The types of
reaction, however, and the relationships between signals and
responses are determined exogenously (outside the system) and
stored in the system for fast response. One such example of
elementary remedial action on the basis of perceived differences
is performed by our thermostats. Once a difference between the
preset and the environmental temperature is observed, on the
basis of stored cues into the system, a mechanism is triggered
to turn on the furnace. The system as yet, however, is not
intelligent enough to reason out or understand what are the
principles which govern the matching process or the cause and
effect relationships. There is a simple one-to-one correspondence
between a sirnal and the reaction.
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5, Stora^re of Cause and Effect Relationships for Operations ;
At this stage the system has the prerequisites for exercising
elementary intelligence. It can associate the signals it
generates through comparisons with functional relationships of
general applicability. Notice here that the correspondence
between the data and the functional forms is "many-one" that
is to say the association occurs on the basis of the semantic
content of variables and forms and not on the basis of their
numerical levels alone.
To clarify some of the points that we raised let us use a
very simple example. Let us assume that we want to use a
control system to check on our ability to multiplyi The general
functional relationship here ist
Y = CX
where Y is the answer, C is the scalar of multiplication and
X is the multiplicand (independent variable). If we cannot
store in our system cause and effect relationships then we must
store all the possible answers for all possible scalars and
multiplicands. That is how, incidentally, we used to be taught
multiplication, by memorizing the multiplication tables. Alter-
natively we can store the semantic content of the equation and
forego storing every possible structural relationship we might
need. .In the first case as soon as we specify C and X the
system through matching will readily retrieve the corresponding
answer if stored, or else get confused. In the second case, it
will associate the operation to be performed with the appropriate

- 22 -
functioneil relationship, introduce the specified scalar and
variable into the equation, in a way that preserves its meaning,
and carry out the multiplication before reporting the answer.
The example that we used here points out another
characteristic of intelligence. Given limited storage capacity
we will always be faced with a choice between (a) storing a lot
of raw and semi-processed data, such as we are now doing in
accounting records, or else (b) store "indecomposable" (in their
rawest form) data and general purpose functional relationships.
In the first case we obtain fast retrieval of only the things
that we stored and in the form we stored them, while in the
second we have a slower system but with manipulative capability
to relate data to cause and effect relationships. So always
there will be "trade-offs". For control of operations at the
low levels fast retrieval is important, but for planning,
especially at high levels in the organization, manipulative
capability is much more important because the time sensitivity
of decisions in general is smaller the higher up we go.
6. Inferring Probabilistically and Challenging the Ctorrent Models :
We have already mentioned that flexibility and questioning
attitude are necessary to lead us sequentially to better and
better systems. Stage 5 above led us to what I like to call a
"functional" accounting system. The latter is operating on
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assumed functional relationships whose validity up to now the
system has no intelligence to question. So the next step is
to introduce into our managerial infonnation system the
capability tos
(a) Assess the probabilistic significance of the results
from operations and so separate those observations which
probabilistically are the result of purely stochastic
(chance) elements from those which indicate probable
existence of problems. This, as you can appreciate,
will allow real management by exception on the assumption
. that the functional relationships are correct,
(b) Question the functional relationships themselves
on the basis of the results from operations ^ and re-
evaluate the faith management placed in the various
alternative models.
7. Deriving General Purpose Cause and Effect Relationships From
Experience ;
With stage 6 above the infonnation system acquired some deductive
reasoning capacities. Now we wish to introduce into it inductive
reasoning. This can be accomplished if the system acquires
associative powers so that it can search, recognize patterns,
propose alternative hypotheses, design and analyze experiments
to test the alternatives, learn from experience and derive more
general purpose (abstract) functional relationships to report to
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management. Environmental, behavioral, as well as technical
considerations enter into these patterns which in turn condition
managerial expectations and influence their plans and actions.
All this of course must be done on the basis of incomplete
information because of the very probabilistic nature of the
various cause and effect configurations. Stage 7 opens the
way to associative information systems.
The above arguments seem to imply that in order to reach
this stage of intellipence we need to store into the system two
types of data, (two data bases):
a) Indecomposable observations
b) Functional relationships associated in terms of
conditional patterns.
It is obvious, of course, that the observations serve as
inputs to the patterns, which change on the basis of what the
observations probabilistically dictate,
8, Deriving Functional Relationships to Test the Applicability of
Functional Relationships ;
This last step is the epitome of intelligence. It refers to meta-
sysxems and will be necessary for any system which automatically
provides managerial planning process control, and helps management
to plan better. Although the description of this stage sounds very
formidable, actually the difficulty lies not in Stage 8 but in the
transition from Stage 6 to Stage 7. Once the latter is reached.
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then Stage 8 will automatically follow, since it utilizes the
same logical operations used at Stage 7 but at a more abstract
level,
I already made the statement that usefulness aside,
accounting is the only continuous, integrated, and most
comprehensive managerial information system that we have today
^
It may be interesting, therefore, to rank it in terms of intel-
ligence, I am sure that no one will be surprised if I classify
it as being at Stage 3, that is to say, at the pre-intelligence
level. Intelligence starts at an advanced Stage U, so there is
plenty of challenge aihead of us«
III, Efforts Toward Implementation
The question now facing us is: How can we start developing a managerial
information system with the characteristics alluded to in the previous
section?
I would like to report briefly on two general approaches that I tried.
My report on one of these two attempts will be very short because its
results can be summarized in the word "failure". The two approaches are:
A. Total Approach Starting From Scratch. That is to say»/
ignoring the existing system, and planning and designing a
managerial information system based on theory, with no
constraints whatsoever except those imposed by theory and
technology. This method creates an infinite number of
instabilities for the system theoretician, chaos.
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disorganization and at least in my case, failure, I presume
that this will also be the fate of the organization which
completely scraps its existing total information system and
attempts to install a new one in its place.
If a lot of limiting assumptions a)?e made and a lot of
variables are fixed, or if a part of the total system is
redesigned, then some progress can be recorded. As you can
appreciate, however, the results in this case will be of
limited value.
B. Start with the Existing System and Improve Continuously
at the Margin, This approach, unlike the previous one, accepts
things as they are and applies theory and optimization techniques
at the local level. In order that it succeed, it must first of
all provide for procedures by means of which the area encom-
passed by the analysis becomes everexpanding. In this way
the chances for incompatibilities between the various subsystems
are extensively reduced.
Then we must also somehow make certain, that the boundaries
or lines of demarkaticm between subunits and subsystems are
drawn correctly. That is to say, we must provide for measure-
ments of the efficiency of organization structures,
I have been quite encouraged in my efforts to design intelligent
information systems using an approach as described under B above. So let
me now give you a step by step superficial sketch of the whole system as
far as I succeeded in pursuing it.
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1. Choose the Highest Level in the Organization Where the
Dominant Operations Are Amenable to Characterization, This
level will be the starting point of the whole analysis. Some
type of standardization of the operations at this level must
be possible otherwise there will be no way one can analyze
the results from operations and determine their significance.
I must stress that complete standardization is not necessary,
only some temporary characterization. If an operation can be
brought under existing budgetary planning and control schemes
then it does most probably have the desirable attributes.
Furthermore, the techniques that I will describe are applicable
not only in manufacturing operations , but an3rwhere tentative
cause and effect relationships can be established.
2, Analyze the Results from Operations, We mentioned previously J
that information systems are generating signals on the basis of
observed differences. That is to say, differences between the
tentative planned levels, and the assumed cause and effect
(functional) relationships underlying these plans. So we must
have a system for measurement and the present accounting system
can suffice for data gathering purposes. We must only make
sure that it collects the data that are necessary for checking
ift (a) the operations are efficient and (b) the cause and effect
relationships are correct.
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Once we observe the differences then the system asks:
Are the deviations (accounting variances) statistically
significant given that our characterization of the process is
correct? This is the first step toward a probabilistic control
system and it can be applied today. It operates on sampled
information and saves the organization a lot in terms of data
gathering, storing, processing, reporting and reviewing super-
fluous and often meaningless information. The sample size of
data to be analyzed, the degree of aggregation and the duration
of the reporting cycle are among the items determined by the
system itself. By storing into the system the method used by
managers to determine the significance of the observed deviations,
and also storing the decision rules that they apply on the basis
of their findings, the system can carry out these functions
automatically and report to managers only what is relevant.
This is a real management by exception.
In order to give you an appreciation of the potential
savings in terms of time, energy and resources involved in a
change from the present deterministic systems to a probabilistic
system, let me say that in one case where this approach was
7
The theory underlying this system and its operational implications
are described in: Zenon S, Zannetos, "Standard Costs as a First Step
to Probabilistic Control: A Theoretical Justification, an Extension and
Implications", Accounting Review , Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April 196U, pp.
296-304.
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tried it reduced the entries in the weekly report of the Vice
President for Distribution of one large firm from over 200C
multi-column entries to 22 o Furthermore, this approach
provides management with better information because it also
reports the probability that the observed deviations are
caused by chance versus by a system which is out of control.
If persistent 9 veu?iances close to sero and around
invariable averages are, according to this system, a sign of
stagnation and sickness rather than excellence. For it implies
that the advantages of learning and proceduralization are not
used toward further improvements but only for relaxation and
easy life. Exceptionally favorable variances are as much the
focus of attention of a probabilistic system as the exceptionally
unfavorable B because these may be the result of successful
experimentation which should be spread within the organisation,
3. Check on the Budgets and Standards, In order to check on the v
probabilistic significance of the results from operations we have
to assume that the functional relationships behind the budgets
and standards are correct. Next we turn around and accept the /
results in order to question the budgets and standards. This type
of analysis, known as Bayesian, marries managerial intuition to
objective analysis and in this sense subjects managerial judgments
to statistical validation sequentially. So back and forth we apply
Steps 2 and 3 and get better and better feel of the situation.
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I must also add that this system has memory. It does not close
out the variances to the Income Statement or anywhere else and
forget them. On the contrary, the cumulative memory of the
information system is brought to bear on each and every
observation, and the system sequentially converge* on the most
probable levels of performance,
U. Analyze the Causes of Variations in Performance, The next J
step is to subject the "accounting variances" to statistical
analysis of variance. Notice that so far we have been dealing
with individual observations , budgets and standards, although
all these may have been aggregated. While it is true that we
have provided in the system for sequential tests, the latter
were not applied to groups of observations or to the components
of the aggregates, to determine if there are any differences
among them and establish patterns of performance. To elaborate
a little further, suppose that for a given department we
observed a variation from expected performance v , the
system as described up to Step 3 will then detemnine how
probable it is that v was caused by chance alone. It will
also check on the alternative standards to reassess their
applicability in the light of the new information provided by
operations. There is nothing to guarantee, however, that
within the department there are no significant differences
in the performance of groups which in the aggregate are
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canceled out. This is very relevant information for managers.
It is also important to observe how the performance of the sub-
units within groups changes over time (accounting period by
accounting period). So we apply statistical analysis of
variance to the output of the accounting process,^
In addition to a comparison of the performance (a) among
various subunits within a group or department for an account-
ing period (week, month, etc.) and (b) of the various subunits
over several accounting periods, the statistical analysis of
variance provides us with tools to establish elementary cause
and effect relationships. And this because part of this
analysis is the explanation of the components of the total
statistical variance, that is to say, an explanation of how
much of the variability can be explained by the various causal
factors.
5, Introduce the Cause-Effect Relationships Into the Information
System. Once we derive elementary cause and effect relationships
which are statistically significant, then naturally the next
step is to introduce them into the continuous information system
of the firm. This is a significant development and the birth of
gThe proof that this can be done, with an illustration, can be found
in: Zenon S. ZannetoSj, "Toward a Functional Accounting System: Accounting
Variances and Statistical Variance Analysis", Industrial Management
Review
,
Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 1966, pp. 71-83.
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what I elsewhere chose to call a "functional accounting system".
By meems of this system we can: (a) learn about the consequences
of alternative plans » decisions, and actions, once we establish
their impact on the various independent variables that enter into
our functional relationships; (b) carry out the implications of
observed variations in the causal variables j and (c) generate
better data for evaluation of the performance of those in charge
of operations. In other words, through these capabilities of
the information system, the managers will not only be relieved
of reviewing a lot of unnecessary information, but will also get
plenty of help from the information system in establishing the
meaning of what has been singled out for their attention. They
will be given an explanation of what caused what part of the
variability, and a projection of its consequences. In fact,
especially if the relationships occur with time lags, the system
can revise the operating plans and budgets of subsequent
operations if necessary
o
Such an analysis as described edsove, will aid managers in
evaluating the performance of their suboperations because it
will separate the part of variation in performance that is
I chose this term because of the functional relationships that are
stored in the accounting systeme In reality it is a functional and
probabilistic system.
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caused by: (i) pure chance, (li) factors controllable by those
In charge of the operations, and (ill) factors which originate
outside and therefore are not directly controllable by the unit
whose performance is studied.
6, Measure the Interrelationships Between Units, The statistical v
analysis of variance generates some information which will be
wasted if it is applied solely at the unit level. We notice
that among other things it could tell us what percentage of the
variation in the performance of a unit is caused by forces that
ar^ beyond its control o Some of these forces originate within
the company but in other subentities than the one whose perform-
ance we are analyzing. If we could somehow measure and analyze
the forces which cause interdependencies in the performance of
units, we would then be able to coordinate the activities of these
units for greater total efficiency. So the question is; How are
the various units interrelated? That is to say, how and why
do they affect each other?
One measxire of such interrelationships is given by the
statistical covariance* As the name implies, this measure
gives us information on how things vary together. The necesscury
inputs for this analysis are the same raw data we used for the
other analyses. So this is, in effect, another step toward
iO
The statistical variances a]?e components of the covarlance*
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intelligent use of the information, and « very significant
one, because now we can derive cause and effect relationships
among units.
The information generated at this step can be used to
facilitate (a) planning, (b) evaluation of performance, and
(c) redesign of the organization structure of the firm. Why
this information facilitates planning and evaluation of
operations should be obvious from our previous discussions
Not so obvious, perhaps, is the third claim, that the system
provides information for restructuring the organization, so
let us deal with this aspect briefly.^^
First of all, we know that all the operations within the
firm are interdependent, otherwise they should not be under the
same roof. We also know that the organization structure with
its particularities of relative centralization and decentraliza-
tion creates an artificial partitioning of the total firm, or a
mock independence for the various subunits to help them plan and
operate in the short run. This configuration is just a moans to
an end, and should not be permanent. The above analysis.
Those interested in pursuing this topic in more detail may wish to
read: Zenon S, Zannetos, "On the Theory of Divisional Structures: Some
Aspects of Centralization and Decentralization of Control and Decision
Making", Management Science , Vol. 12 j No. 4, December 1965, pp. U9-69;
and Measuring the Efficiency of Organization Structures; Some Implica-
tions for the Control System of the Firm , M.I.T. Sloan School of
Management Working Paper, No. 117-65.
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accepting these premises, askss On the basis of present cause
and effect relationships, are the existing buffers between
subunits as well as the number of subentities necessary, or
did they become ends in themselves?
The analysis of covctriations gives us indications as to
how the subunits are interrelated in terms of the dimensions
we choose to measure. Are they, for example, reinforcing
(positive covariation) or offsetting (negative covariation)
each other? Are these relationships symmetrical or are there
asymmetries for variations above versus below expected levels
of performance? How do variations at the subunit level affect
the total organization?
A study of the covariances can give us a lot of help in
understanding these forces and how they relate to the total
within the firm. Negative covariances normally indicate the /
need for centralizations The cause of negative covariation in
these cases is the use of a common resource which is dominant
and critical for the operations of the units that are related
in this fashion g Ifj, therefore, these units are allowed to plan
on a relatively decentralized basis then of necessity they will
create a lor of unnecessary excess capacity and slack in the
system to buffer their operations. The remedy here is joint
planning and re.lative recentralization to eliminate the slack.
Mere increase in the flow of information between the units will
not be sufficient in this case, because what is necessary is
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flexibility for fast deployment of the critical resources. If,
however, we obtain negative covariations with one variable
lagged s then information transmission may be sufficient depending
on whether the lead time provided by the faster transmission of
information is sufficient to allow the second unit to replan and
shift the necessary resources.
Positive covariances (both units moving in the same
direction up and down) normally indicate a need for neutralisation
by separating or buffering the related units. The organizational
changes that take place in such cases lead toward relative
decentralisation. The assumption, of course, here is that whether
the movements are up or down they are harmful to the total opera-
tions when units are coupled together. If asymmetries exist in
the consequences of variations, that is to say, if a variation
above the planned level for unit A forces a similar variation
for unit B and no harm and wasting of resources occur, but a
variation below for A causes the same for B and a lot of harm
ensues, then appropriate information filters and capacity or
time buffers can be introduced to utilise the beneficial
influence but eliminate the destructive.
Once we analyze the covariances and their components
(variances and correlation coefficients) we will obtain clues
(a) on the type of functional relationships among units that
need to be stored in the system, and (b) whether time lags are
necessary. These characteristics will further improve the
planning capabilities of our information systems and for the
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first time we will be able to obtain as part of the routine flow
of information with the finiii signals for assessing the
efficiency of organization structures. What is more, with the
introduction of time lags, our information systems more and more
become prognostic in natxire*
7. Expand the Analysis of Covariances, By encompassing larger
and larger units in our analysis, we can expand our investigation
to the total organization) We cang therefore, introduce into
the managerial information system functional relations of greater
and greater applicability. We can also expand this analysis over
a greater suid greater span of time if it is necessary to obtain
prognostic indicators. Once obtained, of course, all these
relationships are made part of the information system of the firm»
It must be mentioned in conjunction with variance and
covariance analysis, that we are not dealing with deterministic
cause and effect relationships. We are not completely sure
whether what we have is fundamental and not accidental. This
much must be realized and conceded. However, if the system
allows flexibility and checks sequentially to find better and
better solutions, we need not worry excessively about these
shortcomings.
The advantages on the other hand of the system that I i
sketched here are manyw
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(1) It is inexpensive. It mostly operates on ^
sampled data. In many respects this system is less
expensive than the current accounting systems for
low level operations.
(ii) It is probabilistic and naturally provides
more meaningful information for managerial decisions.
It sifts through the generated data and singles out
only what is important to merit executive attention.
The decision rules applied by the system can be those
used by the executive. Therefore, it provides a
real management by exception.
(iii) It stores cause and effect relationships, uses
them for evaluation, planning and operating decisions,
and adjusts them step by step as new information is
introduced. In this sense it provides a lot of the
necessary information the executives need before they
take efficient remedial action.
(iv) It can be applied at any level and expanded, -i
It takes things as these are, and sequentially asktt
Can we do better? It is not an attempt toward an
overall analytical optimum which I am convinced we
cannot achieve. It uses optimisation techniques for
subparts as needed and also simulation, but it is
neither.
JL5-1967/
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(v) The analysis of covariances points out the most
sensitive spots in the organization) This infoirmation
is not only important for problem identification
purposes, but also for seeding innovation. Innova-
tive capabilities are very scarce. Instead of
encouraging innovation at all levels within the
organization, it is not unreasoneible to choose a few
units to concentrate our efforts and let the
information system through the cause and effect
relationships spread (force) innovation all through
the firm. What I am suggesting in effect is to
exploit the "gravitational forces" within the firm
to accomplish our goals with the minimum of efforts
(vi) It uses organization structures as a variable
or as an input to the system to be manipulated as
conditions dictate, This is a very powerful attribute
since information systems and organization structures
are two sides of the same coin. If one fails the
other will too, for there can be no effective
motivation under these circumstances. Also, since
there is a need for flexibility, so that the
information system becomes more intelligent through
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experiance, the organization structures must be
equally flexible, ^ The tools provided here can
help us obtain information for possible reorganizations
on a routine basis.
(vii) It questions the established organizational
buffers and re-examines their value versus the cost
of keeping them«
(viii) It incorporates in it behavioral aspects as
well as capabilities for design and analysis of
experiments,
(ix) It is prognostic.
As I hope you will agree this system goes a long way to aid management
in its planning and control activities of both operations and organization
structures. It can check on the efficiency of the chosen plans but it
cannot generate by itself alternatives and suggest them to management for
action on the basis of changes in the planning variables that the information
system sensed. For the latter we need advanced associative faculties and
capabilities for recognizing patterns about which we do not as yet know
very much.
12
From a theoretical point of view it appears that organization
structures may have to alternate between relative centralization and de-
centralization!, And this because for specialization and innovation we
need relative decentralization, but for dissemination and proceduralization
of the acquired knowledge we need relative centralization.
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Once we succeed in storing into our continuous information system
pattern recognition capabilities then we can develop the structure within
which plans are made, and from then on be able to control the planning
process as contrasted to the control of chosen plans . One way of starting
this part of the information system is to store the patterns of environ-
mental conditions and availability of operating capacities which dictate
certain plans, as well as the assumed functional relationships which relate
them. I am sure you will appreciate that this is not an easy task because
of the enormous number of dimensions of these patterns. But if we overcome
these difficulties then the indecomposable data of information systems for
planning process control will be patterns of relationships and the system
can go through the steps we described in Part III to increase its
sophistication.
IV Conclusion
I hope that I succeeded in conveying to you the significance of the
characteristics of the information systems for the management process. I
tried to present to you the many facets of an integrated system which
occupies quite a bit of my research efforts, Some of the ideas I presented
in my talk I explored rather fully in the pastj but many others only
superficially as yet. Hopefully some of you and your organizations will
in the future devote more of your research efforts in the area of effective
managerial information systems for planning and control.
The focus of my attention was mostly on the planning effort of
managers because it sets the structure within which decisions and
operations take place. That is why I want the information systems to be
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intelligent enough to relieve managers of many of their present tasks, as
soon as the latter can be routinized or characterized, so that they can
devote more of their efforts to higher level and long-range planning. But
one may ask: If the system is to relieve managers of the planning tasks
they succeed in routinizing, why should they continue doing it? Who wants
to deal with the unknown all the time? Planning is not easy!
I am sure you know the answer to the above questions. It is the fate
of managers to deal with unstructured situations. Most certainly it is
easier to fight fires, count how many you put out and get an immediate
sense of accomplishment, than to assess your planning efforts to prevent
them. There is no way on© can get an immediate indication of accomplishment
in the area of long-range planning and this disturbs many people to the
point that they favor routine tasks. Managers who complain that routine
trouble shooting does not leave them with any time for planning become
nervous wrecks as soon as they are given the long sought time and freedom
to plan. The turmoil, soul searching, and reorientation is very painful,
but the other alternative is abdicationo The new managerial information
and control systems are with us and we cannot ignore them. The sooner we
as managers learn to live with them and exploit their potentialities, the
better off we will be in eveiry respect. But there is no sense denying it,
it is rough to be a manager. Thamk you.
» '
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